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Abstract
We propose in this note a simple non-parametric test of Richter-
rationality which is the basic definition of rationality used in choice func-
tions theory. Loosely speaking, the data set is rationalizable in the Richter’
sense if there exists a complete-acyclic binary relation that rationalizes the
data set. Hence a data set is rationalizable in the Richter’ sense if there
exists a variable intervals function which rationalizes this data set. Since
an acyclic binary relation is not necessary transitive then the proposed
Richter-rationality test is weaker than GARP . Finally the test is per-
formed over Mattei’s1 data sets.
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1 Introduction
The test of GARP aims to test the existence of an utility function which ra-
tionalizes the data set. However from a mathematical standpoint, an utility
function is an order isomorphism. Therefore (over a finite set) to require an
agent’s utility to be represented by a utility function is equivalent to requiring
this agent’s preference relation to be complete and transitive. Unfortunately
there is no theoretical or empirical justification to require a preference to be
transitive. This problem is an old one (see for instance Fechner [1860], Poincaré
[1902], or Armstrong [1939]) and can be understood through the following ex-
ample: an agent with a preference relation R can be indifferent between 10g of
sugar and 11g, between 11g of sugar and 12g of sugar, but not be indifferent
between 10g and 12g. Since this agent’s indifference relation is not transitive
and is a component of the agent’s preference relation R, then R is not transitive.
The theoreticians of preferences have therefore built several non-transitive pref-
erences whose asymmetric component is transitive and whose symmetric com-
ponent is not necessarily transitive. The most famous relation of such a type is
the so-called semi-order whose functional representation has been widely stud-
ied by Luce [1956], Scott and Suppes [1958], Roberts [1970], Fishburn [1970],
Fishburn [1973], Bridges [1983], Chateauneuf [1987], and many others. However
the requirement of the transitivity of the asymmetric part of a binary relation
is also not easy to justify and has been challenged by Kreweras [1961], Burros
[1974], Bell [1982], Fishburn [1984], Anand [1987], Fishburn and Lavalle [1987],
Loomes [1991], Dombi and Vincze [1994], and many others. Hence the mod-
elling of preferences by acyclic preference relations (whose both symmetric and
asymmetric components are not necessarily transitive). Now for most theoreti-
cians of preferences the “appropriate” system of axioms over preference relations
is the following: preference is complete, preference is acyclic. Abbas and Vincke
[1993], Agaev and Alekserov [1993], Subiza [1994], Rodriguez–Palmero [1997],
Diaye [1999] show that such a preference can be represented by a functional
which is called Variable Intervals Function. Therefore (as in the case of a pre-
order preference), if there exists a complete-acyclic preference which rationalizes
a data set, then there exists a correspondence demand which rationalizes this
set. And of course an agent who uses (in order to choose) a correspondence
demand derived from a variable intervals function is not less rational than an
agent who uses a correspondence demand derived from an utility function. Both
agents maximize their preferences and they can both choose their optimal ele-
ments over any subset of the main set of elements. Let us recall at this stage
that by rationality, we mean the basic definition of rational choice by Richter
[1971] which states that a choice is rational if there exists a binary relation which
rationalizes this choice: the chosen elements over any set S corresponds to the
most preferred elements in S with respect to a binary relation. The purpose
of our paper is to provide a simple test of this Richter-Rationality in the case
where the revealed preference relation is rationally equivalent to a complete-
acyclic binary relation. This test can be achieved by testing an axiom called
by us, RARP (Richter Axiom of Revealed Preference). Since rationalization
by a complete-acyclic preference is weaker than rationalization a preorder then
RARP is weaker than GARP (and also weaker than SARP ). Hence we expect
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to find over data sets more individuals who respect RARP . Actually we think
that the main reason why the GARP ’s tests performed over experimental data
sets2(or over micro-economic data sets) find a significant number of violations
is that some individuals who are rational in the Richter’ sense are declared
irrational by the test of GARP .
The paper is organized as follow. The second section sets some basic def-
initions in choice functions theory and demand theory. The third section is
devoted to our main result which proves that a data set can be rationalized by a
variable intervals function (i.e. by complete-acyclic preferences) i.f.f it satisfies
RARP . In the fourth section, we test this axiom over Mattei’s experimental
data sets already used in Mattei [2000]. Finally the section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Binary relations.
Let Q be a binary relation over a set X (i.e. Q is a subset of X × X).
Q can be divided into an asymmetric component, denoted PQ, defined by
∀x, y ∈ X,xPQy ⇔ xQy and not(yQx); and a symmetric component, denoted
IQ, defined by ∀x, y ∈ X,xIQy ⇔ xQy and yQx; we shall write Q = PQ + IQ.
Let us define the following properties of a binary relation Q on the set X:
• Q is reflexive if ∀x ∈ X,xQx.
• Q is complete if ∀x, y ∈ X,xQy or yQx.
• Q is asymmetric if ∀x, y ∈ X,xQy => not(yQx).
• Q is antisymmetric if ∀x, y ∈ X,x 6= y, xQy => not(yQx).
• Q is transitive if ∀x, y, z ∈ X,xQy and yQz => xQz.
• Q is acyclic if x1, . . . ., xn ∈ X, not(x1PQx2PQ . . . .PQxnPQx1).
• Q is a weak order if Q is reflexive and transitive.
• Q is a preorder if Q is complete and transitive.
• Q is an order if Q is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
• Q is a linear order if Q is asymmetric, transitive, and if ∀ x, y ∈ X, x 6= y,
xQy or yQx.
• Q is a complete order if Q is complete, antisymmetric and transitive.
2For instance Sippel [1997], Mattei [2000], Février and Visser [2004]. See also Harbaugh et
al.[2001], Andreoni and Miller [2002].
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Let us set the following definitions:
• The dual relation of Q denoted Qd is defined by:
Qd = {(x, y) ∈ X2 : (y, x) ∈ Q}
• The lower section associated with x denoted Q(x→) is the set:
{y ∈ X : xQy}
• The upper section associated with x denoted Q(→ x) is the set:
{y ∈ X : yQx}
2.2 Choice Functions and Demand Theory
Definition 1 Let X be a set of objects, P (X) be the set of subsets of X, and F
be a set of non-empty subsets of X. F is called a domain of choice and (X,F )
is called a choice space.
Definition 2 A domain of choice F is selective if F 6= P (X)\∅ and it is
abstract otherwise. If F is selective but it includes all finite non-empty subsets
of X then it is said to be quasi-abstract.
Definition 3 A choice function is a function C defined from F to P (X) with
the condition that C(S) ⊆ S.
We will restrict ourselves to the class of decisive choice functions, that is
choice functions such that C(S) 6= ∅, ∀ S ∈ F . We can derive the following
binary relations (over X) from a choice function C:
∀ x, y ∈ X, xRy ⇔ ∃ S ∈ F : x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S (2.1)
∀ x, y ∈ X, xKy ⇔ ∃ S ∈ F : x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S\C(S) (2.2)
Definition 4 (Richter [1971]) A choice function C is rational if there is a
binary relation Q (over X) such that
∀ S ∈ F, C(S) = {x ∈ S : xQy, ∀ y ∈ S}
Richter has also shown that any binary relation rationalizing a choice func-
tion C is rationally equivalent to R the so-called revealed preference relation.
Therefore a choice function is rational i.f.f it is rationalizable by the revealed
preference relation R.
Remark 1 Of course the revealed preference relation R is not necessarily com-
plete or transitive.
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If we want the revealed preference relation which rationalizes a choice func-
tion to fulfil some properties like completeness or transitivity then the choice
function C has to respect some well-known conditions like WARP or SARP .
Criterion 1 (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) ∀ x, y ∈ X, xKy ⇒
not(yRx)
Criterion 2 (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) ∀ x, y ∈ X, xK∗y ⇒
not(yRx), where K∗ is the transitive closure of K.
For instance if the domain of choice F is abstract or quasi-abstract, then
(see Arrow [1959]) WARP and SARP are equivalent and a choice function C
respects WARP i.f.f it is rational and R (the revealed preference) is a preorder.
2.3 Demand Functions
Let us now consider consumer theory which is, from a mathematical standpoint
a sub-theory in the sense of Bourbaki [1954] of the theory of choice functions.
In consumer theory, the set of objects is X = {· · · , x1, · · · , xi, · · · } with xi =(
x1i , · · · , xki
)
where the xji are quantities of goods j = 1 to k. X is included in
Rk+.
B (a set of subsets of X) is the domain of choice, the elements of B are
called budgets, and (X,B) is called budget space.
Moreover the choice functions are called in consumer theory, demand “func-
tions” denoted by h.
Let x be a quantity-vector, p be the price-vector at which x is available and
let m be an income. Only the competitive budgets {x ∈ X : p.x ≤ m} are of
interest to a theorist. Hence only the subset C (of B) :
C = {{x ∈ X : p.x ≤ m} ,∀p,∀m}
is of interest to us.
Let us denote by (p,m) such a competitive budget. The revealed preference
relation R will be defined in consumer theory by :
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi R xj ⇔ ∃ (p,m) ∈ C : xi ∈ h(p,m) and xj ∈ (p,m)
That is :
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi R xj ⇔ ∃ (p,m) ∈ C : xi ∈ h(p,m) and p.xj ≤ m
Under the locally nonsatiation hypothesis, we have the following property
sometimes called Walras law (See Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
∀ (p,m) ∈ C and x ∈ h(p,m), p.x = m
and the revealed preference R is therefore defined by :
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi R xj ⇔ ∃ (p,m) ∈ C : xi ∈ h(p,m) and p.xj ≤ p.xi (2.3)
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The binary relation K in equation (2.2) becomes in consumer theory (under
the locally nonsatiation hypothesis):
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xiK xj ⇔ ∃ (p,m) ∈ C : xi ∈ h(p,m), p.xj ≤ p.xi and xj /∈ h(p,m)
(2.4)
Therefore WARP can be rewritten (in consumer theory) by :
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi 6= xj , xi R xj ⇒ not(xj R xi) (2.5)
That is R is antisymmetric. And SARP becomes :
∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi 6= xj , xi R∗ xj ⇒ not(xj R∗ xi) (2.6)
where R∗ is the transitive closure of R.
2.4 The Non-parametric Tests ofWARP , SARP and GARP
Let D = {(xi, pi)}Ni=1 be a data set including prices pi ∈ Rn+ and bundles of
goods xi ∈ Rn+ purchased at price pi. It is therefore possible to construct
the revealed preference relation R from the data set D. This relation is easy to
construct since for any xi which belongs to the data set, there exists (pi,m) ∈ C
such that xi ∈ h (pi,m). This is the reason why (see equation (2.3)) the revealed
preference R is usually defined, in most papers devoted to non-parametric tests,
by :
∀ xi, xj , xi R xj ⇔ pi.xj ≤ pi.xi (2.7)
and a binary relation denoted RS (called in the literature the strict revealed
preference) is defined by:
∀ xi, xj , xi RS xj ⇔ pi.xj < pi.xi (2.8)
Moreover in order to take into account errors of optimization and/or mea-
surement that can affect total expenditure such that the "true" value of the
total expenditure is e× (pi.xi) with e ∈ [0, 1] called the Afriat efficiency index,
researchers construct the binary relations R and RS for several values of e. In
this case (2.7) and (2.8) become respectively:
∀ xi, xj , xi R xj ⇔ pi.xj ≤ e× pi.xi
∀ xi, xj , xi RS xj ⇔ pi.xj < e× pi.xi
Our tests in section 4 are performed for e = 1 ant for the Afriat critical
index, that is to say the value of e such that there is no violation of the axiom
tested. However in what follows and until section 4 we assume without loss of
generality that e = 1, that is to say R and RS are defined by (2.7) and (2.8).
Now set the following definition :
Definition 5 [Varian 1982] A utility function u rationalizes the data set D =
{(xi, pi)}Ni=1 if for any xi,
u(xi) ≥ u(x) whatever x ≥ 0 such that pi.x ≤ pi.xi
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and set the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
Criterion 3 (GARP [Varian 1982]) ∀ xi, xj ∈ X, xi R∗ xj ⇒ not(xj RS xi)
It is obvious that SARP implies GARP and WARP . However there is no
relationship in general between GARP and WARP . Let us now recall that for
finite cases, the axioms and implications below are equivalent :
Axiom Implications
SARP : eq.(2.6)
Stable complete-order preference,
there is a utility function that rationalizes the data set,
there is a demand function that rationalizes the data set.
GARP : crit.3
Stable preorder preference,
there is a utility function that rationalizes the data set,
there is a demand correspondance that rationalizes the data set.
WARP : eq.(2.5) Stable complete and antisymmetric preference,there is a function that rationalizes the data set.
3 The main result: rationalization by a variable
intervals function
In the papers which use non-parametric tests, the main issue is to test the ra-
tionalization of the data set by a utility function. Indeed the main motivation
of these papers is to test if the agents’ empirical behavior is the same as the
one postulated in microeconomic theory : maximization of a utility function
under a budget constraint. However if the criterion of optimization is not dis-
putable (from our point of view) and is not disputed in general, the requirement
of the preference relation to be transitive is disputed. Some arguments against
the transitivity axiom can be found in Anand [1987], Fishburn [1988], Anand
[1993] and especially in Burros [1974]. There is a consensus among preferences
theory’s researchers that a good candidate for preference consistency should be
the acyclicity axiom. There are two main reasons for this consensus. First hav-
ing an acyclic preference does not prevent an agent to choose : this agent can
maximize his preference. The second reason is that this axiom is compatible
with the choice function theory. Indeed as shown by Jamison and Lau [1973],
when the domain of choice is abstract then a choice is (Richter-) rational i.f.f it
is rationalizable by a complete acyclic preference relation. Let us therefore set
that the agents’ preference relations are complete and acyclic. Such a preference
relation is representable by a function called Variable Intervals Function exactly
as a preorder preference is representable by a utility function.
Definition 6 Let Q be a binary relation over a set X. (X,Q) satisfies the
Variable Intervals Model if there exist two functions (u, s) with u : X → R and
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s : X ×X → R+ such that :
xPQy ⇔ J(x, y) > J(y, x) (3.1)
xIQy ⇔ J(x, y) ∩ J(y, x) 6= ∅
(3.2)
where:
J(x, y) = [u(x), u(x) + s(x, y)] is an interval of the real line.
Over a finite set X, a binary relation Q is complete and acyclic i.f.f (X,Q)
satisfies the variable intervals model (see for instance Diaye [1999]).
Remark 2 Let us set the function f(x, y) = u(x) + s(x, y). It is easy to see
that
J(x, y) > J(y, x)⇔ u(x) > f(y, x)
J(x, y) ∩ J(y, x) 6= ∅ ⇔ u(x) ≤ f(y, x) and u(y) ≤ f(x, y)
If there is no risk of confusion, we will call such a function f , a Variable
Intervals Function. The function u can be understood as the representation of
the agent’s underlying preorder preference. However the context of choice makes
him deviate (through the threshold function s) from this underlying preference.
It is nevertheless important to stress that s is definitively not an error term in
the probabilistic sense. If we assume that s is symmetric then we get the below
characterization of variable intervals functions by Abbas and Vincke [1993]:
xPQy ⇔ u(x)− u(y) > s(x, y)
xIQy ⇔ |u(x)− u(y)| ≤ s(x, y)
which permits the following interpretation: the agent strictly prefers x to y
if the difference of their utilities is greater than a threshold function s which
depends on x and y.
Example 1 Let X ⊆ R2+ and f(x, y) = u(x) + ‖x− y‖2. Take for instance
x = (1, 1), y = (4, 1), z = (2.5, 2), u(x) = 8.5, u(y) = 1.5, u(z) = 5.
x is strictly preferred to z which is strictly preferred to y, but the agent’s is
indifferent between x and y.
Of course since acyclic preferences allow for thick indifference curves, local
non-satiation is not fulfilled. Let us set the following weaker condition.
Definition 7 A preference relation Q on X is weak locally non-satiated if for
every x ∈ X and every ε, ε′ > 0, there exist y, z ∈ X such that ‖x− y‖ < ε and
‖y − z‖ < ε′ and y Q z PQ x.
If the agent maximizes a variable intervals function instead of a utility func-
tion then he can, over a data set, violate GARP , SARP and WARP .
Example 2 Let R be the agent’s acyclic revealed preference over a data set :
x −→ z
 ↓
y
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where −→ = RS = PR
and  = IR
SARP is violated because R∗ the transitive closure of R is not antisymmet-
ric, WARP is violated because R is not antisymmetric, and GARP is violated
because yR∗z and z RS y.
In the above example 2, the agent is “irrational” in the sense that he violates
GARP, while he is able to choose the best element with respect to his preference
(which is here x). This is why we propose instead to check the compatibility of
the data set with a variable intervals function maximization.
Definition 8 A variable intervals function f = u + s rationalizes the data set
D = {(xi, pi)}Ni=1 if for any xi,
(i). u(xi) > u(x) + s(x, xi) or
(ii). u(xi) ≤ u(x) + s(x, xi) and u(x) ≤ u(xi) + s(xi, x)
whatever x ≥ 0 such that pi.x ≤ pi.xi
As already stressed out by Varian [1982, page 946] in the case of rational-
ization by a utility function, only rationalization by a non degenerated variable
intervals function is of interest to us:
Definition 9 The data set D = {(xi, pi)}Ni=1 is rationalizable by a non degen-
erated variable intervals function if:
PR 6= ∅ ⇒ not{u(xi) ≤ u(xj) + s(xj , xi)
and
u(xj) ≤ u(xi) + s(xi, xj)
∀xi, xj , xi 6= xj}
Where PR is the asymmetric component of R the revealed preference relation in
(2.7).
Criterion 4 (RARP ) A data set satisfies the Richter Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence (RARP ) if
∀ i 6= j, xi P ∗R xj ⇒ not(xj PR xi)
Where P ∗R is the transitive closure of PR.
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Theorem 1 (The main result) 3 The following two conditions are equiva-
lent.
1. The data set satisfies RARP .
2. There exists a weakly locally non-satiated, variable intervals function which
rationalizes the data set.
RARP is easy to test and its algorithm complexity is exactly the same as
the one of GARP .
4 Tests over Mattei’s experimental data sets
We want now to test the RARP , GARP , SARP and WARP over Mattei’s
experimental sets.
The purpose of our tests is first to distinguish over the data sets the individ-
uals who are Richter-rational in the sense that they respect RARP from those
who are not rational, and second to distinguish among the rational individuals
those who are complete-order preference maximizers (SARP ), preorder prefer-
ence maximizers (GARP ) or complete-acyclic preference maximizers (RARP ).
4.1 The data sets and the tests.
The three experimental data sets constructed by Mattei [2000] include respec-
tively 20, 100, and 320 individuals. They have to choose among 8 goods4 in 20
different budget situations.
Note that in order to compute the transitive closure of the revealed preference
relation (GARP and SARP), and that of its asymmetric component (RARP),
we have used an algorithm which determines all the paths between two vertex
in the matrix associated to the revealed preference relation (GARP and SARP)
and the matrix associated to its asymmetric component (RARP). The results
are the same as those of the algorithms of minimum cost path like Warshall’s
algorithm or Dijkstra algorithm.
The approximate Bronars power have been computed using the second Bronars
algorithm which is described in appendix 3.
3The proof is given in appendix 1.
4In the first two data sets, the goods are: milk chocolate, salted peanuts, biscuits, text
maker, ball-point pen, plastic folder, writing pad, post it. In the third data set, the goods
are: milk chocolate, biscuit, orange juice, iced tea, post it, audio cassette c90, ball point pen,
battery(R6, 1.5V).
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4.2 Results
Tables 1 to 3 report the number of subjects who violate at least once the con-
sidered axiom for several values of the Afriat Index. We can read these results
in the following way.
Over the first data set (table 1):
• 15 (75 percent) subjects are complete-order preference maximizers and
preorder preference maximizers (their behavior satisfies SARP and GARP).
• None of the subjects is irrational in the Richter sense.
Over the second data set (table 2):
• 41 (41 percent) subjects are complete-order preference maximizers (their
behavior satisfies SARP).
• 56 (56 percent) subjects are preorder preference maximizers (their behav-
ior satisfies GARP).
• 97 (97 percent) subjects are complete-acyclic preference maximizers (their
behavior satisfies RARP).
• 3 are irrationals in the Richter sense.
Over the third data set (table 3):
• 155 (48.75 percent) subjects are complete-order preference maximizers
(their behavior satisfies SARP).
• 219 (68.43 percent) subjects are preorder preference maximizers (their
behavior satisfies GARP).
• 304 (95 percent) subjects are complete-acyclic preference maximizers (their
behavior satisfies RARP).
• 16 are irrationals in the Richter sense.
Table 1
Number of WARP, SARP, GARP, and RARP irrationals subjects over the first data set (20
subjects).
Afriat Index GARP SARP WARP RARP
1.00 5 5 5 0
0.99 2 2 2 0
0.98 1 1 1 0
0.97 1 1 1 0
0.96 0 0 0 0
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Table 2
Number of WARP, SARP, GARP, and RARP irrationals subjects over the second
experimental data set (100 subjects).
Afriat Index GARP SARP WARP RARP
1.00 59 59 44 3
0.99 30 30 30 2
0.98 15 16 16 1
0.97 11 11 11 1
0.96 8 8 8 2
0.95 5 5 5 2
0.94 3 3 3 2
0.93 3 3 3 0
0.83 0 0 0 0
Table 3
Number of WARP, SARP, GARP, and RARP irrationals subjects over the third
experimental data set (320 subjects).
Afriat Index GARP SARP WARP RARP
1.00 164 165 101 16
0.99 65 66 66 10
0.98 50 50 50 5
0.97 35 35 35 6
0.96 22 22 22 3
0.95 17 17 17 2
0.94 14 14 14 3
0.93 11 11 11 0
0.66 0 0 0 0
Let us now call Absolute Power in the Sense of Bronars, the standard Power
Index in the sense of Bronars (see. Appendix 2). However we define also a
Relative Power Index in the sense of Bronars. In order to understand why,
let us recall that power in the sense of Bronars aims to compare the behavior
of the individuals in the data sets with that of individuals who choose their
consumption bundles randomly from their budget sets. Therefore, what is im-
portant in this notion of power is not only its absolute value but the relative
increase of the number of "irrational" (in the sense of RARP, WARP, GARP or
SARP) individuals when testing the axioms over the initial data sets and the
random consumption data sets. For instance suppose that when testing GARP
over a given data set, the (absolute) Bronars Power Index is 100%. What can
we conclude if at the same time the percentage of GARP violating individuals
on this data set is 98% ? Let us compare this example with the following one
where when testing GARP over a data set, the (absolute) Bronars Power Index
is 60%; but the percentage of GARP-violating individuals on this data set is
1%. Since the relative increase of GARP-violating individuals is greater in the
second example than in the first one, we will say that the relative Bronars Power
Index (that is the relative increase of GARP-violating individuals between the
initial data sets and the random consumption data sets) is bigger in the second
example than in the first one. Thus over the second and the third experimen-
tal data sets (respectively 100 and 320 subjects), the (absolute) Bronars Power
Index of RARP is on average about 55 per cent for an Afriat Index of 1 and
is weaker than those of WARP, GARP and SARP. But the Relative Bronars
Power Index of RARP is on average about 13.5, about ten times greater than
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those of WARP, GARP, SARP. Finally, the reason why the (absolute) power in
the sense of Bronars of RARP is "small" compared to those of GARP for in-
stance, is that RARP is a very very weak axiom and the use of other definitions
of (absolute) power (see Harbaugh and Adreoni [2005]) will change nothing to
this fact.
Table 4
Bronars Power Index (method 2) and Relative Bronars Power Index (result in brackets) over
the first experimental data set
Warp Sarp Garp Rarp
Afriat Index
1 0.968 (2.872) 0.983 (2.932) 0.9745 (2.898) 0.513 (.)
0.99 0.917 (8.17) 0.9445 (8.44) 0.9465 (8.465) 0.412 (.)
0.98 0.834 (15.68) 0.861 (16.22) 0.8765 (16.53) 0.3295 (.)
0.97 0.741 (13.82) 0.759 (14.18) 0.748 (13.96) 0.235 (.)
Table 5
Bronars Power Index (method 2) and Relative Bronars Power Index (result in brackets) over
the second experimental data set
Warp Sarp Garp Rarp
Afriat Index
1.00 0.9882 (0.6749) 0.9917 (0.68) 0.9896 (1.24) 0.5617 (17.72)
0.99 0.9475 (2.15) 0.9595 (2.19) 0.9606 (2.20) 0.4477 (21.38)
0.98 0.8542 (4.69) 0.8861 (4.53) 0.8836 (4.52) 0.3381 (32.81)
0.97 0.7271 (5.61) 0.7449 (5.77) 0.7619 (5.92) 0.2263 (21.63)
Table 6
Bronars Power Index (method 2) and Relative Bronars Power Index (result in brackets) over
the third experimental data set
Warp Sarp Garp Rarp
Afriat Index
1.00 0.9680 (0.88) 0.9830 (0.90) 0.98888 (2.13) 0.55572 (10.11)
0.99 0.9170 (3.51) 0.9445 (3.57) 0.95716 (3.64) 0.44106 (13.11)
0.98 0.8340 (4.33) 0.8610 (4.51) 0.88119 (4.63) 0.32809 (19.99)
0.97 0.7410 (5.77) 0.7590 (5.93) 0.75109 (5.86) 0.22184 (10.83)
5 conclusion
The purpose of GARP testing is to see if agents in the "real world" maximize
a utility function as postulated by economic theory. According to various tests
over experimental data sets from many researchers, it seems that the answer
is negative. We think that this answer is quite normal. Indeed to require an
agent to maximize a utility function is equivalent to requiring him to maximize
a complete and transitive preference relation. However the basic definition of
rationality in choice functions theory (recall that demand theory is a sub-theory
in the sense of Bourbaki [1954] of choice functions theory) states that a rational
agent is the one who maximizes a preference relation. There is no need for this
preference to be transitive. Nevertheless we can require the preference relation
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to be (at least) acyclic. The question (set by our paper) is the following : do
agents in the "real world" maximize a complete-acyclic preference relation, that
is, do they maximize a generalized utility function called variable intervals func-
tion? The answer provided by our tests on Professor Mattei’s experimental data
sets seems to be yes. Indeed these tests have been checked for consistency with
an axiom we called RARP equivalent to the rationalization by a variable inter-
vals function (who can represent a complete-acyclic preference), and we found
that the number of individuals who are complete-acyclic preference maximizers
(RARP consistent) represents over the three data sets respectively, 100 percent
(first data set), 93 percent (second data set), and 84 percent (third data set), of
individuals who are not preorder maximizers (who are not GARP consistent).
Thus although over the three data sets more than 30 percent individuals are
not preorder maximizers, a great part of them (more than ninety percent on
average) are rational in Richter sense.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Theorem 1.
1. Definition: Generalized Afriat Inequalities (GAI).
GAI is fulfilled if there exist numbers ui > 0, sij = sji ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ...n,
and some numbers λi, αij , αji > 0, i, j = 1, ...n such that:
ui + sij < uj + λjpj(xi − xj) (5.1)
or
|ui − uj | = sij + αjipj(xi − xj) (5.2)
∀i, j = 1, ...n
We can remark that it is not possible for any i, j to fulfill both (5.1) and
(5.2) (in the above definition). Moreover, if pjxj ≥ pjxi and not(pixi ≥
pixj) then it is impossible to have (5.2). And when pjxj ≥ pjxi and
pi ≥ pixj then it is impossible to have (5.1).
2. Proof of theorem 1.
(a) (2)⇒ (1)
Suppose that xiP ∗Rxj and xjPRxi. It must therefore be the case
that:
xiPRxj ⇒ u(xi) > u(xj) + s(xj , xi)
is impossible (otherwise we have u(xi) > ... > u(xj) > u(xi)).
Since f = u + v rationalizes (see Definition 8) the data set D and
u(xj) > u(xi) + s(xj , xi) is impossible then:
xiPRxj ⇒ u(xi) ≤ u(xj) + s(xj , xi)
and
u(xj) ≤ u(xi) + s(xi, xj)
Moreover, xiIRxj implies necessarily (because IR is symmetric by
definition):
u(xi) ≤ u(xj) + s(xj , xi)
and
u(xj) ≤ u(xi) + s(xi, xj)
Hence we have:
PR 6= ∅
18
and xiRxj ⇒
u(xi) ≤ u(xj) + s(xj , xi) and u(xj) ≤ u(xi) + s(xi, xj)
whatever xi, xj .
That is f is degenerated.
Well this case is excluded by hypothesis. Hence:
xiP
∗
Rxj ⇒ not(xjPRxi): Rarp.
(b) (1)⇒ (2)
We will first show that (1) implies GAI.
Let X be the support of D. If (1) then R is acyclic over X.
Let
L = PL ∪ IL
with
PL = PR ∪ T
and
IL = IR
Where T ={(x, y) ∈ JR : (y, x) /∈ T and the acyclicity of L is
preserved}
Let H be a preorder 5such that:
PL ⊆ PH ⊂ H ⊆ L
Since X is finite then H is representable by a numerical function v
such that:
∀xi, xj ∈ X,xiHxj ⇔ v(xi) ≥ v(xj)
We will now construct the numbers ui, λi, sij , and αi,j :
i. Set (without loss of generality) sii = 0.
ii. If xiPLxj , i 6= j, then take
sji ∈ [0, a[
with a = |v(xi)− v(xj)|
iii. Set (without loss of generality): sij = sji.
5Such a preorder necessarily exists. For instance we can construct H in the following way:
i. Take the transitive closure of PL denoted P ∗L.
ii. Extend P ∗L into a linear order denoted eL.
iii. H is the dual relation of eL.
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iv. Let6
λi = max
xj∈PL(→xi)
{v(xj)− v(xi) + sij
pi(xj − xi) }
with PL(→ xi) = {xj ∈ X : xjPLxi}
v.
λi = inf]λi,+∞[
vi. Let7
λi = min
xj∈PL(xi→)
{v(xi)− v(xj) + sji
pi(xi − xj) }
with PL(xi →) = {xj ∈ X : xiPLxj}
vii. If PL(→ xi) 6= ∅ and PL(xi →) 6= ∅ then do:
A.
βi =
{
sup[0, λi[ if λi 6= +∞
λi otherwise
B. • If λi > βi then set: 8
ui = v(xi) + λipi(xi − x∗j )
where
x∗j = argmax pi(xi − x)
x ∈ PL(xi →)
• Otherwise (if λi ≤ βi) set:
ui = v(xi)
viii. If PL(→ xi) 6= ∅ and PL(xi →) 6= ∅ then:
λi = βi =
{
sup[0, λi[ if λi 6= +∞
η > 0 otherwise
ix. If xiILxj then set:
sji ∈ [max(a, b),+∞[
with b = |ui − uj |.
x. Set(without lost if generality) sij = sji.
xi.
αij =
{ |ui−uj |−sij
pi(xj−xi) if pi(xj − xi) 6= 0
a > 0 otherwise
6∀xj ∈ PL(→ xi), pi(xj − xi) > 0.
7∀xj ∈ PL(xi →), v(xi)− v(xj)− sji > 0.
8Indeed if λi > βi then it must be the case that ∀xj ∈ PL(xi →), we have v(xj) + sji ≥
v(xi) + λipi(xj − xi)
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Such ui, sij , λi, αij , fulfill GAI:
Let i, j = 1, ...n. Then we have;
either xiPRxj , or xiIRxj , or xiJRxj .
If xiPRxj then xiPLxj and by construction we have:
ui + λipi(xi − xj) > uj + sij
uj + λjpj(xj − xi) > ui + sij
If xiIRxj then xiILxj and we get:
|ui − uj | = sij + αjipj(xi − xj)
If xiJRxj then either xiPLxj or xjPLxi.
Without lost of generality, suppose that xiPLxj , then we have:
ui + λipi(xi − xj) > uj + sij
uj + λjpj(xj − xi) > ui + sij
We will now construct a variable intervals function which rationalizes
the data set D.
Let f defined from R×X into R with:
f(x, xj) =
u(x)+s(x, xj) =

ui + sij if x = xi ∈ X
min{ui + sij + λipi(x− xi)} if pjxj > pjx and x /∈ X
i
max{ui + sij + αjipi(x− xi)} if pjxj ≤ pjx and x /∈ X
i
Let x ≥ 0 with pjxj ≥ pjx, then 2 cases can occur:
i. x ∈ X.
In this case, by construction of the ui, sij , λi, αij , f rationalizes
x.
ii. x /∈ X.
Then:
• If pjxj > pjx then:
f(x, xj) = u(x) + s(x, xj) ≤ uj + sjj + λjpj(x− xj)
Since sjj = 0 and λjpj(x− xj) < 0 we have:
u(x) + s(x, xj) < uj
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• If pjxj = pjx then
f(x, xj) = u(x) + s(x, xj) ≥ uj + sjj + αjjpj(x− xj)
Since sjj = 0 and λjpj(x− xj) = 0 we get
u(x) + s(x, xj) ≥ uj
Finally the weakly locally non satiation property is trivially
fulfilled.
3. Remark.
Let us remark that in our proof (in order to improve the algorithmic
complexity of our algorithm) we do not need to have a number λi for any
i = 1, ...n, or to have numbers αij for any i, j = 1, ...n. Actually, we have
if xi is such that PL(xi →) and PL(→ xi) are empty sets then we do not
create λi. Likewise if xi is such that IL(xi →) is empty then we do not
need to create the αij . Nevertheless, for any i, if λi is not computed then
at least , one αij is computed (because if λi is not computed then xi is
indifferent to any xj with respect to binary relation L).
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Appendix 2: The approximate Power of the test.
From a statistical viewpoint the power of a test between two hypotheses is
given by the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when the alternative
hypothesis is true. In our case the former is that the consumer behavior satisfies
the axiom we test, and the latter that it does not. But these tests being non
probabilistic, their power is unknown. However there seems to exist a relative
consensus consisting in trying to compute an approximate power of the non-
parametric test called power in the sense of Bronars .
Indeed, S. Bronars compute the approximate power of the test by taking as an
alternative hypothesis Becker’s notion of irrational behavior. In this case the
consumer is assumed to choose consumption bundles randomly from his budget
set and the power of the tests is given by the fraction of data sets in which vio-
lations of the axiom occurs. So as to do this, S. Bronars constructs algorithms
which generate random consumption data exhausting the budget set in each
period. In our case we have used Bronars second algorithm. It works as follows:
-In a first time we draw N i.i.d uniform random variables in each year, named
z1,t,...zN,t, t = 1, ...T .
-Using these random variables the (random) budget shares are then given
by:
wi,t =
zi,t∑N
i=1 zi,t
It is straightforward to show that the consumption bundles computed from
these budget shares exhaust the budget set line in each year, indeed:
N∑
i=1
pi,t × xi,t =
N∑
i=1
wi,t × ptxt
= ptxt
Where ptxt is the actual total expenditure for period t.
These budget shares are then used to compute consumption bundles (in each
period they are multiplied by total expenditure and divided by the actual price
of the corresponding commodity) from which we test the axioms.
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